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8 Epistemology or Pedagogy, That Is 
the Question
Paul A. Kirschner Utrecht University
Epistemology or Pedagogy, That IS the Question
At the time of writing, there is an animated debate which has apparently split the 
educational world—both teachers and researchers—into two ideological fac-
tions. The first faction is depicted as  old- school pedagogues who believe that all 
teaching and instruction should be based upon classical,  sage- on- the- stage, 
expository and didactic approaches of universal truths. The second faction is 
depicted as  fuzzy- brained social constructivists who believe that nothing is true 
and that learners can only learn by constructing their own knowledge and behav-
iors through undirected experiences. This debate has infiltrated every pore of our 
discussions on teaching, learning, and education at scientific and professional 
conferences, in scientific and professional journals, and, in many countries, even 
the mass media and national politics.
 Of course we, as rational  right- minded people, know that neither faction is 
correct and that the “truth” lies in the middle. For this reason I will try to avoid 
this ideological discussion and concentrate on a deeper underlying question, 
namely whether we are selling ourselves and our children short when we use or 
substitute an epistemology of a domain for a pedagogy for teaching in that 
domain. Before beginning, I need to define these two terms.
Epistemology and Pedagogy
Epistemology is the study of knowledge and what it means to know something 
(Shaffer, 2007). It is a branch of science that studies the nature, methods, limita-
tions, and validity of knowledge and belief and addresses questions such as: What 
is knowledge? How is knowledge acquired? What do people know? In more 
pedestrian terms, it studies the way someone practicing a profession understands 
her or his profession and gains new knowledge in that profession. For the natural 
scientist, it could be the “scientific method” often carried out in teams. For the 
anthropologist it could be ethnographic or descriptive/deductive research from 
within, as part of a group or society being studied. And for the philosopher it 
could be dialogic in debate with others.
 Pedagogy, on the other hand, is the art or science of being a teacher, generally 
referring to strategies or styles of instruction. A pedagogy can be (1) general, as in 
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the strategies, techniques, and approaches that teachers use to facilitate learning 
in general; (2) specific to a domain, such as the application of specific strategies, 
techniques, and approaches belonging to a domain (i.e., professional or peda-
gogical content knowledge) to the instruction of that specific domain (e.g., math-
ematics, English as a second language, music); or (3) specific to a certain approach 
to teaching that may or may not be domain specific, such as  work- based peda-
gogy (i.e., the organization of the social activities, organizational structures, and 
cultural practices by which newcomers, such as student interns, come to acquire 
and engage that knowledge (Hughes & Moore, 1999)),  problem- based pedagogy 
(i.e., “an approach to structuring the curriculum which involves confronting stu-
dents with problems from practice which provide a stimulus for learning” (Boud 
& Feletti, 1991, p. 21)), or even constructivist pedagogy (i.e., the “creation of 
classroom environments, with goals that focus on individual students developing 
deep understandings in the subject matter of interest and habits of mind that aid 
future learning” (Richardson, 2003, p. 1627)).
 Having made this distinction, the next step is to look at learners. The next 
section will deal with learners and their characteristics (i.e., their cognitive devel-
opment and their expertise) and why the epistemology of practicing in a domain 
is not a good pedagogy for learning that domain.
Learners
There are two major problems with using a domain’s epistemology as its peda-
gogy. The first is rooted in developmental psychology and biology where Luria 
and Piaget long ago made clear that children or adolescents (i.e., typical learners 
in initial education: preschool through university) are not miniature adults. 
Luria discussed the metamorphosis of a child into an adult as follows:
The incorrect belief that children and adults differ only in quantitative terms 
has become firmly entrenched in the general consciousness. Its proponents 
argue that if you take an adult, make him [sic] smaller, somewhat weaker 
and less intelligent, and take away his knowledge and skills, you will be left 
with a child. This notion of the child as a small adult is very widespread . . . 
essentially the child is . . . in many respects radically different from the adult, 
and [that he] is a very special creature with his own identity . . . qualitatively 
different from the adult.
(Vygotsky & Luria, 1930/1992, Chapter 2)
In Piaget’s view (1955), cognitive development, which he called development of 
intelligence, is based upon assimilation of newly experienced phenomena in 
already existing cognitive schemata and accommodation of those schemata in 
cases where the new information does not match the existing schemata. In his 
words, intelligence “progresses from a state in which accommodation to the 
environment is undifferentiated from the assimilation of things to the subject’s 
schemata to a state in which the accommodation of multiple schemata is distin-
guished from their respective and reciprocal assimilation” (n.p.). This process 
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proceeds through a series of what he called cognitive stages, each characterized by 
a general cognitive structure that affects all thinking. Each stage represents how 
reality is understood during that stage, and each stage, except the last one, is an 
inadequate approximation of reality. In other words, learners—at least those in 
initial education—see the word differently from practitioners, interpret and 
understand it differently, and are not capable of carrying out the abstract cogni-
tive transformations necessary for true knowledge construction. Such learners 
apply inadequate, often faulty novice theories that differ greatly from the sophis-
ticated theories of a domain or the world held by practitioners (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Mazens & Lautrey, 2003; Partridge & Paap, 1988). As Hannust and 
Kikas (2007) state in their research on experimentation for teaching children 
astronomy, children
acquire factual information rather easily and therefore early instruction 
should introduce the core facts related to the topics. Some children 
 over- generalized new knowledge very easily, indicating that the materials 
used in teaching may promote the development of  non- scientific notions 
and that those notions must be addressed promptly to avoid the develop-
ment of coherent  non- scientific models.
(p. 89)
Even if we concentrate on teaching for and learning by those who might be able 
to think abstractly and carry out the necessary cognitive transformations to think 
inductively and construct theories, we are confronted with a second problem 
when using epistemology as pedagogy, namely that learners or novices are not 
miniature professionals or experts. Experts not only know more and work faster 
than novices, they also deal differently with problems and solve them in different 
ways. Here follows a number of ways that novices and experts differ.
 De Groot (1946, 1978) determined that chess grand masters, when determin-
ing what the next move should be, do not consider more moves than less highly 
ranked expert chess players, but “zoom in” on potentially good moves earlier in 
their search than “weaker” players. As Gobet and Simon (1996) state, “stronger 
and weaker players examine nearly the same number of branches, but . . . the 
stronger players select more relevant and important branches . . . because of their 
greater ability to recognize significant features” (p. 53). This ability to better rec-
ognize significant features was also found by Boucheix, Lowe, and Soirat (2006), 
noting that when viewing animations of the working of a defective piano, expert 
piano tuners fixate on areas of the animations that contain crucial but 
 less- conspicuous content more frequently than novices who tend to fixate on 
 high- salience information, neglecting  less- conspicuous aspects necessary for 
building  high- quality mental models.
Cuthbert, du Boulay, Teather, Teather, Sharples, and du Boulay (1999) in 
their review on  expert- novice differences in diagnostic medical cognition, 
determined that: experts produce fewer, but more general hypotheses . . . at 
an earlier stage of problem formulation than novices. Furthermore, experts 
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work from findings to a hypothesis (forward reasoning) using a breadth first 
approach (considering and evaluating several hypothesis at once) . . . novice 
reasoning is characterised as backwards (from hypothesis to data), and fur-
thermore, depth first (considering and evaluating a single hypothesis at a 
time). Experts also demonstrate superior hypothesis evaluation skills, in par-
ticular, they are better able to disregard discredited hypotheses and are more 
likely to change their hypothesis to fit the data than to change the data to fit 
their hypothesis or to ignore inconsistent findings altogether.
(pp. 23–24)
In other words, the differences between experts and novices manifest themselves 
not only at the conceptual level, but also at the level of epistemology and ontol-
ogy (Jacobson, 2000).
 Other areas where much research has been carried out on expert–novice dif-
ferences are physics (Chi et al., 1981; Hardiman, Dufresne, & Mestre, 1989), 
computer programming (Adelson, 1981), mathematical problem solving (Shoen-
feld & Herrmann, 1982), and teaching (Hogan, Rabinowitz, & Craven, 2003). 
Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (1999) conclude that this body of research shows 
that:
it is not simply general abilities, such as memory or intelligence, nor the use 
of general strategies that differentiate experts from novices. Instead, experts 
have acquired extensive knowledge that affects what they notice and how 
they organize, represent, and interpret information in their environment. 
This, in turn, affects their abilities to remember, reason, and solve problems.
(p. 19)
Donovan, Bransford, and Pellegrino (1999) present six major differences between 
experts and novices, four of which have concrete bearing on how we teach and 
learn. The first is that experts attend to and notice more important features or 
meaningful patterns of information in a problem or a situation than novices. As 
stated,  eye- movement research has shown that experts fixate on crucial though 
 less- conspicuous content more frequently than novices who fixate on high- 
salience information, neglecting  less- conspicuous aspects that are necessary for 
building  high- quality mental models (Boucheix et al., 2006). Learners miss the 
necessary basic domain knowledge to do this, and concentrate on superficially 
conspicuous information, regardless of its actual importance (Lowe, 1999, 2004).
 This variation in attending is most probably due to the second major differ-
ence, namely that experts have a great deal of accessible content knowledge orga-
nized to reflect deep understanding of the subject matter. In other words, what 
experts already know determines what they see and how they see it. Because 
novices know little about a subject or a domain, they do not know where to look 
and, having looked at something, have trouble correctly interpreting what they 
have seen.
 The third difference is that the experts’ knowledge is not simply reducible to 
sets of isolated facts or propositions, but reflects “contexts of applicability” of that 
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knowledge. Donovan et al. (1999) called this conditionalized knowledge, though 
it could also be called contextualized or situated. It means that experts have a type 
of knowledge that includes knowledge of the contexts and/or situations in which 
it is or will be useful. In contrast, a novice’s knowledge is often inert (Whitehead, 
1929); it has been learned but cannot be accessed for problem solving.
 The fourth difference (Donovan et al., 1999) is that experts retrieve important 
aspects of their knowledge with little effort whereas novices spend a great deal of 
effort attempting to remember and process individual knowledge elements. 
Experts have many and varied rich cognitive schemas at their disposal in which 
their knowledge is organized and from which needed aspects of that knowledge 
can be easily and quickly retrieved (Glaser & Chi, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977). Larkin (1979) found that physics experts remember sets of related equa-
tions while novices retrieve a series of single equations, suggesting sequential 
memory search. “Experts appear to possess an efficient organization of knowl-
edge with meaningful relations among related elements clustered into related 
units that are governed by underlying concepts and principles” (Bransford et al., 
1999, p. 26).
 In other words, applying an epistemology used by domain experts or practi-
tioners as a pedagogy for learning in that domain will not work. In the following, 
I will look at this problem within a specific and  well- studied domain, namely the 
natural sciences.
Practicing Science or Learning to Practice Science?
Curriculum reform in the natural sciences has emphasized the experience of the 
processes and procedures of science, moving away from the teaching of science 
as a body of knowledge (Bybee, 2003; Harmer & Cates, 2007; Hodson, 1988). 
Bybee stated that
students learn by constructing their own meaning from experiences [and] . . . 
that science teaching should consist of experiences that exemplify the spirit, 
character, and nature of science and technology . . .  inquiry- oriented labora-
tories are infrequent experiences for students, but they should be a central 
part of their experience in science education. 
(Bybee, 2003, n.p.) 
In 1996, the National Research Council declared that inquiry into authentic 
questions generated from student experiences should be the central strategy for 
teaching science. In 2005, Gabric, Hovance, Comstock, and Harnisch stated that
the ultimate goal was to provide a learning environment in which students 
could feel like scientists in their own classrooms. This meant that our stu-
dents would need to be involved in the acquisition of their scientific 
knowledge by – not only reading and writing about – but actually doing 
science.
(p. 80)
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 This focus is coupled to the assumption that to teach the process of science 
(i.e., the pedagogy), we can best confront learners with experiences either based 
on or equivalent to science procedures (i.e., the epistemology). This has led to a 
tenacious commitment by educators, instructional designers, and educational 
researchers to discovery and inquiry methods of learning which is based upon 
confusing teaching science as inquiry (i.e., an emphasis in the curriculum on the 
processes of science) with teaching science by inquiry (i.e., using the process of 
science to learn science). The error here is that no distinction is made between 
the behaviors and methods of the scientist—who is an expert practicing her or 
his profession—and those of a student who is essentially a novice.
 Even if this were true—and now I play devil’s advocate—the epistemology 
used in school science is that of the inductive, positivist scientist. Cawthron and 
Rowell (1978) described this as a “conception of scientific method as . . . a well 
defined,  quasi- mechanical process consisting of a number of characteristic 
stages” (p. 33). It is as though scientists look at the world with no a priori ideas 
and that they objectively observe, collect, record, analyze, and interpret without 
underlying hypotheses or preconceptions except those relating to the logic of 
thought processes. This objective, impartial, and unbiased scientist finally draws 
conclusions about relationships and makes generalizations about an observed 
phenomenon based upon the facts collected. It seems as though “constructivist” 
educators and curriculum designers see the domain taught as being “positivist”, 
containing general and identifiable truths. Southerland and  Gess- Newsome 
(1999) confirmed this, describing even those teachers who had learned science 
through modern,  discovery- based curricula as a form of discovery maintain posi-
tivist views of knowledge, learning, and teaching. Discovery, thus, becomes trivi-
alized to “ stage- managed  pseudo- discovery of the inevitable” (Hodson, 1985, 
p. 40).
 But I digress. Returning to the main point, it is clear that many curriculum 
developers and instructional designers either are not aware of or do not see the 
distinction between the epistemological basis of the natural sciences and the ped-
agogic basis for teaching the natural sciences. Because experiments are widely 
used in science, science teachers are conditioned to regard them as a necessary 
and integral part of science education. But students do not practice science. They 
are learning about science and/or learning to practice science. It is the teacher’s 
job to teach science, teach about science, and teach how to do science.
 A student, as opposed to a scientist, is still learning about the subject area in 
question and, therefore, possesses neither the theoretical sophistication nor the 
wealth of experience of the scientist. Also, the student is learning science—as 
opposed to doing science—and should be aided in her/his learning through the 
application of an effective pedagogy and good instructional design.
 We find these concerns in educational and psychological literature as far back 
as Ausubel (1964) and as recently as Klahr and Nigam (2004) and Mayer (2004). 
Ausubel expressed problems that accompany the failure to differentiate between 
the scientist and the student. According to him, scientists are engaged in a 
 full- time search for new, general, or applied principles in a field, whereas stu-
dents are engaged in learning the basic subject matter of a field which scientists 
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learned in their student days plus the way in which scientists practice. If students 
are ever to discover scientifically, then they must first learn both the content as 
well as how to discover! The student “cannot learn adequately by pretending [to 
be] a junior scientist” (p. 298). According to Mayer, many phenomena associ-
ated with using discovery make it relatively ineffective as an instructional 
method. Klahr and Nigam state that
children in discovery situations are more likely than those receiving direct 
instruction to encounter inconsistent or misleading feedback, to make 
encoding errors and causal misattributions, and to experience inadequate 
practice and elaboration. These impediments to learning may overwhelm 
benefits commonly attributed to discovery learning—such as “ownership” 
and “authenticity”.
(2004, p. 661)
 Kyle (1980) described scientific inquiry as a systematic and investigative per-
formance ability which incorporates unrestrained thinking capabilities after a 
person has acquired a broad, critical knowledge of the particular subject matter 
through formal learning processes. This same idea is posed as an apparent 
anomaly by Klahr and Nigam (2004) when they note that “most of what students 
(and teachers and scientists) know about science was taught to them, rather than 
discovered by them” (p. 661).
 This lack of clarity about the difference between learning and doing science 
has led many educators to advocate the discovery method as the way to teach 
science (Allen, Barker, & Ramsden, 1986; Bybee, 2003; Kirschner, Sweller, & 
Clark, 2006). This approach fits well in contemporary  learner- centered pedago-
gies emphasizing direct experience and individual inquiry (e.g., experiential 
learning (Kolb & Fry, 1975; Itin, 1999), authentic learning (Downes, 2007), 
 inquiry- based learning (Dewey, 1997), and  problem- based learning (Barrows & 
Tamblyn, 1980;  Hmelo- Silver, 2004;  Hmelo- Silver & Barrows, 2006)). Cawthron 
and Rowell—in 1978—had the prescience to characterize this as the coalescing 
of the logic of knowledge and the psychology of knowledge under the mesmeric 
umbrella term “discovery.”
 But to discover (i.e., notice) anything, learners need a prior conceptual frame-
work—as discussed earlier in this chapter when the differences between experts 
and novices were discussed—as well as the ability to think in abstract ways about 
what they have noticed (see the earlier discussion on the development of think-
ing). Discovery, thus, presupposes a prior conceptual framework and the ability 
to interpret and sometimes reinterpret what has been seen or experienced in 
abstract terms, but there is no guarantee that it will lead to new concepts, much 
less correct ones. This is because, first, novices have little knowledge and experi-
ence in a domain which causes them to encode information at a surface or super-
ficial level, while experts have much knowledge and experience in a domain and 
are, thus, able to encode information at a deeper, more structural level (Chi et 
al., 1981; Novick, 1988; van Gog, Paas, & van Merriënboer, 2005). Second, 
novices do not simply produce random guesses in the absence of knowledge, 
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“but rather as systematically off the mark in a particular way that makes sense 
given a particular misconception” (Means, 2006, p. 508).
 The strangest and possibly most unfortunate aspect of this whole problem is 
that this is not new. Novak (1988), in noting that the major effort to improve 
secondary school science education in the 1950s and 1960s fell short of expecta-
tions, stated that the major obstacle in the way of “revolutionary improvement of 
science education . . . was the obsolete epistemology that was behind the emphasis 
on ‘inquiry’ oriented science” (pp. 79–80). More recently, Chen and Klahr (1999; 
see also Klahr, this volume) demonstrated that direct instruction was signifi-
cantly better than discovery learning on children’s ability to design simple, 
unconfounded experiments, and even more important, those receiving direct 
instruction were also superior on a  far- transfer test of experimental design 
administered 7 months later.
Conclusion
For designing instruction, Vamvakoussi and Vosniadou (2004) warn that “pre-
suppositions that constrain learning are not under the conscious control of the 
learner. It is important to create learning environments that allow students to 
express and elaborate their opinions, so that they become aware of their beliefs” 
(p. 466). Van Merriënboer and Kirschner (2007) note that there are considerable 
differences between domain models that describe the effective mental models 
used by competent task performers and the intuitive or naive mental models of 
novice learners in that domain. Such intuitive or naive mental models are often 
fragmented, inexact, and incomplete; reflecting misunderstandings or miscon-
ceptions where learners are unaware of the underlying relationships between the 
elements.
 As such, how to learn or be taught in a domain is quite different from how to 
perform or ‘do’ in a domain (i.e., learning science vs. doing science). The episte-
mology of most sciences, for example, is often based upon experimentation and 
discovery and, since this is so, experimentation and discovery should be a part of 
any curriculum aimed at “producing” future scientists. But this does not mean 
that experimentation and discovery should also be the basis for curriculum orga-
nization and  learning- environment designing (Bradley, 2005; Kirschner, 1992). 
Modern curriculum developers and instructional designers confuse the episte-
mological nature of a domain with the psychological bases of learning and the 
pedagogic bases for teaching. Epistemology refers to how knowledge is acquired 
and the accepted validation procedures of that knowledge; pedagogy refers to 
how something is taught.
 In the natural and social sciences, for example, the epistemology is often based 
upon experimentation, discovery, and testing. Curriculum designers using a dis-
covery or  inquiry- learning approach operate on the belief that how science is 
practiced is also the best way to teach and/or learn it. Critics of such 
 inquiry- based instruction such as Sewall (2000), caution that such approaches 
are  over- emphasized at the expense of “carefully prepared lesson(s) . . . focused 
and guided . . .; interspersed with small group work when appropriate; and with a 
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clear sense of direction at the beginning and summary at the end, leaving all par-
ticipants with a feeling of completion and satisfaction” (p. 6).
 This ambiguity about the difference between learning and doing science, 
coupled with the current societal prioritization of knowledge construction has 
led educators to advocate discovery as the way to teach science. But discovery 
presupposes a prior conceptual framework (Vosniadou, 2002). Via discovery, 
one can investigate relationships between concepts, but whether this leads to new 
concepts depends upon the structure and content of existing knowledge. Klahr 
and Nigam (2004) conclude, based on their empirical findings, that there is a 
“need to reexamine the  long- standing claim that the limitations of direct instruc-
tion, as well as the advantages of discovery methods, will invariably manifest 
themselves in tasks requiring broad transfer to authentic contexts” (p. 666).
 The origin of these teaching approaches lies in a failure to distinguish between 
learning and doing; in overlooking that students are not experts practicing some-
thing, but rather novices learning about something. It is the teacher’s job to teach 
science, teach about science, and teach how to do science. It is not the teacher’s 
job to practice science as part of the teaching exercise; leave that to the scientists.
Question: Duschl and Duncan. A big part of scientific literacy is learning to distin-
guish scientific claims from pseudoscience and hoax claims. What are the pedagogi-
cal strategies that develop learners’ abilities to assess the status of knowledge claims 
presented by the popular media?
Reply: Kirschner. Van Merriënboer and Kirschner (2007) present a series of 
pedagogic/ instructional- design approaches that are based on realistic (i.e., 
authentic) whole tasks and that contain the support and guidance needed to 
achieve the type of learning and abilities that you ask about.
 To begin, a  well- designed case study could/would present learners with 
descriptions of actual or hypothetical problem situations situated in the real 
world (i.e., a claim presented in the popular media) and require them to actively 
participate in the determination of the validity of that claim. For learning to dis-
tinguish scientific claims from pseudoscience and hoax claims, a case study 
would confront learners with a claim that the popular media has presented (the 
“given state”), a list of possible research results and/or scientific “facts” that is 
not too long and that is directly relevant for determining the validity/truth of the 
claim (criteria for the “goal state”), and  worked- out examples of the thinking 
and possible further search queries for new information necessary to determine 
the validity/truth of the claim (the “solution”). In order to arouse the learners’ 
interest, it may be desirable to use a case study that describes a spectacular event, 
such as an accidental discovery, a success story, or a disputed result, et cetera. In 
a  well- designed case study, learners would be required to answer questions that 
provoke deep processing of the problem state and of the associated operators 
(i.e., solution steps) so that they can compare that case with other cases in order 
to induce generalized solutions. By studying the—intermediate—solutions, 
learners get a clear idea of how a particular domain is organized and what deter-
mines “proof” or “refutation.”
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 In our book we discuss many other learning tasks that could be used such as 
imitation tasks,  non- specific goal problems, completion tasks, reverse trouble-
shooting, et cetera (van Merriënboer and Kirschner, 2007). The common 
element of all of the learning tasks is that they direct the learners’ attention to 
problem states, acceptable solutions, and useful solution steps. This helps them 
mindfully abstract information from good solutions or use inductive processes 
to construct cognitive schemas that reflect generalized solutions for particular 
types of tasks. The bottom line is that having students solve many problems on 
their own is often not the best thing for teaching them problem solving! For 
novice learners, studying useful solutions together with the relationships between 
the characteristics of a given situation and the solution steps applied is much 
more important for developing  problem- solving and reasoning skills than 
solving equivalent problems.
Question: Duschl and Duncan. Without the inclusion of some epistemological ele-
ments used by domain experts or practitioners, how do learners progress from novice 
to expert? When and how do you recommend epistemological elements enter the 
learning environment?
Reply: Kirschner. As should be clear by the answer to the previous question, 
epistemological elements can enter the learning environment very early in the 
learning process. The clue here is that the epistemology of the expert is not the 
guiding principle for the pedagogy, but rather that the learning, i.e., the acquisi-
tion of that epistemology, is the goal and leading principle.
Question: Herman and Gomez. What is the relationship between epistemology 
and pedagogy? Do you mean that no  domain- based epistemology can inform class-
room pedagogy? Or do you mean something more radical, that  classroom- based 
instruction is (should be) divorced from any coherent epistemology?
Reply: Kirschner. The “only” relationship between epistemology and pedagogy 
is based not upon the translation or mapping of an epistemology (on) to a peda-
gogy, but rather the selection of a fitting pedagogy to “teach” (i.e., help the 
learner acquire) the epistemology. In other words, the choice of a pedagogy can 
and possibly must be “informed” by the epistemology that the learner should 
acquire, but is not the same as making use of that epistemology as a pedagogy.
 In addition to the pedagogies discussed in answer to Duschl and Duncan’s 
question is the experimental seminar, a pedagogy specifically designed for under-
graduate students in natural sciences to support the acquisition of the epistemol-
ogy of the natural scientist, first proposed by Conway, Mendoza, and Read 
(1963). Here, students collectively perform an experiment or watch an expert 
perform an experiment. This way they gain a clear concept of how a well-per-
formed experiment progresses. Collective experimentation or demonstration is 
followed by group discussion, where necessary stimulated by an “expert,” such as 
teacher, lecturer, or professor, and in which students can help each other. An 
experiment which is routine and uninteresting to one or two students can trigger 
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a valuable discussion in a group. This provides the student with a model for 
problem identification, experimental design, assembling, testing and calibrat-
ing equipment, data collection, analysis, interpretation and reporting results. 
The possibility to model, discuss, reason, and compare methods and results 
with others is characteristic for this type of practical. An important aspect of 
the experimental seminar is that it makes use of modeling to facilitate the 
development of a template necessary for the learner (see answer to Duschl and 
Duncan).
 A second integral aspect of the experimental seminar is discussion. This is 
what Kollard (1985) calls the didactic translation of observations. To counteract 
any misconceptions arising from a demonstration, a discussion must round off 
the demonstration. In this way both relevant and irrelevant observations can be 
noted and discussed. Discussion also helps promote conceptualization and 
deeper understanding of what has occurred. Support and guidance in the form 
of scaffolding the discussion can be seen as the addition of an additional 
informed opinion. Such discussion encourages students to reflect upon past per-
sonal experience and to use it as a means to discover and evaluate solutions to 
present problems.
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